It is very easy
when researching the past to develop a confidence in the resources available,
whatever they are. It is an easy step from
checking everything available to assuming that you know everything about the
subject.
Historians
study what is left behind. Most of what
we have to look at has survived by accident.
We pine for the documents that we know once existed but did not survive
the ‘weeding process’, the office move’ or ‘the flood’. Few of the records we rely on were created
with the historian in mind. Researchers are often left with scraps -mere
hints of what happened. Often material
exists in different forms and in different places. Research is rarely a product of a trip to a
single archive or on line repository.
Indeed, the coming of on line access has fostered the view the
everything worth knowing can be found with a few clicks of a mouse . This attitude is most often found in the
world of family history but police historians are occasionally prone to this
folly.
The records of
railway, dock and canal policing are scarce and are to be found in lots of
locations. The British Transport Police
History Group (BTPHG) has done tremendous work in bringing together records
from many sources (including more than a couple of skips!). But to research any aspect of RDC policing
means searching far and wide. Oddly it
is one of the reasons why this subject is so much fun.
There is
another class of record that is hard to find.
By this I am referring to records that were meant to be destroyed
because they were deemed too ‘sensitive’ or too secret. The word sensitive in this context is
interesting. It covers everything from data
about people who may still be living to information about the security of the
state. In practice it also includes
material that could be the source of embarrassment.
My attempts to
look at RDC policing during the war has generated a side interest in the relationship
between the railway police forces and the intelligence agencies in the years
until the cold war (any later would trespass on contemporary issues). I am not surprised that there are virtually
no relevant records in the files of the BTPHG or BTP. But this absence does not mean that there was
no operational activity. Therefore, from
time to time I will take the opportunity to dig a little around this subject
when my primary research activities take me near the relevant sources. I don’t expect to find much, but the
occasional hint and reference will be enough to confirm that the railway police started
to play a role in national security long before the advent of the modern
arrangements with BTP.
We know that in
wartime the railways and docks were vital parts of the national infrastructure. The railways and their police played an
important role in the protection of these locations. Elsewhere I have referred to the details
provided to Chiefs of the Railway Police of Atlantic conveys that allowed them,
and the railway companies, to prepare for the onward movement and security of
goods and munitions. Such information
was labelled ‘Most Secret’ and the fear of spies and saboteurs was a great
concern to the authorities. Co-operation
between the Security Service, Met Special Branch and the railway police was
perhaps born out of necessity. By the
middle of the war we know that the Security Service (MI5) had created a regional
structure. One of the functions of this
structure was to liaise with provincial police forces AND with the Railway
Police Chiefs who domains crossed county boundaries. By this time we can see that the Security
Service were supportive of the idea that the railway police (who were combined
under the authority of the Railway Executive for the duration) should attend
Special Branch Conferences and training.
We have no record of whether such attendance became common and there
were a few individuals in County forces who were wary of the railway police. There still are.
We know that in
the immediate post war period the Security Service would advise the railway police
(in this case the LT Police) of communists working for London Transport. This, of course, is a sensitive subject and
one that requires further research.
As the Security
Service release individual files to the National Archives we can sometimes see
a connection with the railway police and this is a promising avenue of
research. I suspect that most mentions
will be peripheral (circulations of wanted persons etc) but perhaps there will
be more. Even Unity Mitford’s MI5 file
mentions that the railway police guarded the gangplank when she returned to the
UK after a period in Germany!
When did all
this start? We can’t be sure, but I was
intrigued by a piece in The Times from 11 January 1926. It is a report of a dinner hosted by the
Great Western Railway Police. Such
dinners were regular events and were an opportunity to network with county
force chief constables and senior leaders from the Metropolitan force. Indeed the guest of honour was the
Commissioner of the Met, Sir William Horwood, himself an ex railway police chief
(NER). But it was the name of another
guest that caught my attention. His profession
or role is not noted in the article. But
we know that Colonel Sir Vernon Kell was the Director General of the Security
Service. In fact he was the first person
to hold that position and he held it longer than any of his successors. The
Police Review Report of the event is a little more forthcoming describing Kell
as the Chief of the Secret service department at the War Office. He had a slight railway connection during his
army service in China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and after his
retirement in 1940 he became a special constable, but why he should choose to
attend this event is unknown. Perhaps he
approved of the menu at what was, and still is, a fine (railway) hotel (now
known as the Landmark Hotel at Marylebone, it was of course the HQ of the British
railways Board for many years).
There are a few
shadows to chase and a lot of gaps to fill.
Let’s see what the surviving records hold.
March 2023
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